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PRECAP; Zirkelbach Construction, Inc. v. DOWL, LLC dba 
DOWL HKM: Do Parties Have the Freedom to Contractually Limit 
their Liability? 
 
Jennifer Shannon 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT is set for Wednesday, July 12, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. in 
the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 
Building, Helena, Montana. 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
Can two sophisticated entities contract to limit liability for 
consequential damages? 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant Zirkelbach paid over $1,000,000 to fix the mistakes of 
their subcontractor, Appellee DOWL.1 When Zirkelbach attempted to 
recover for DOWL’s negligence, the District Court held a clause in the 
parties’ contract limited DOWL’s liability to $50,000.2 
On appeal, Zirkelbach argues that the limitation of damages 
constitutes an illegal exculpatory clause, which Montana’s courts have a 
long history of prohibiting.3 Zirkelbach contends that allowing DOWL to 
limit their liability would effectively permit DOWL to contract away 
repercussions for their negligence.4 Zirkelbach also maintains that the 
clause is ambiguous and therefore should be disregarded.5 DOWL argues 
on appeal that their clause simply limits a part of liability, and therefore is 
not exculpatory.6 DOWL contends that this kind of clause is not only 
enforceable, but common between two sophisticated entities––such as 
Zirkelbach and DOWL––who have the freedom to contract.7 Ultimately, 
the Court must decide on appeal whether the freedom to contract extends 
to a party’s ability to limit their own liability to a minimal amount of their 
foreseeable damages.  
 
 
 
                                           
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Zirkelbach Construction, Inc. v. DOWL, LLC dba DOWL HKM, 
https://perma.cc/5UQY-WLTL (Mont. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. DA 16-0745). 
2 Id. at 6.  
3 Id. at 7–12. 
4 Id. at 13. 
5 Id. at 24. 
6 Appellee’s Brief at 15, Zirkelbach Construction, Inc. v. DOWL, LLC dba DOWL HKM, 
https://perma.cc/PXU6-QHR4 (Mont. Mar. 29, 2017) (Do. DA 16-0745). 
7 Id. at 21.  
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
This case arises out of the construction of a FedEx Ground facility 
in Billings, Montana.8 SunCap, the property owner, hired Zirkelbach as 
the general contractor for the project.9 Zirkelbach subsequently entered 
into a contract (the “Agreement”), with DOWL, a professional design 
company, to provide design work for the facility.10 
The Agreement was a form contract provided by DOWL and 
amended by the parties.11 The Agreement stipulated that Zirkelbach would 
act as the general contractor and DOWL would provide the services of 
“Design Professionals,” including final design, road improvements, on-
site and off-site construction administration, and material testing.12 The 
Agreement also contained the following clause: 
“Consequential Damages/Limitation of Liability. To 
the fullest extent permitted by law, DOWL HKM and 
Client waive against each other, and the employees, 
officers, directors, agents, insurers, partners and 
consultants, any and all claims for or entitlement to 
special, incidental, indirect or consequential damages 
arising out of, resulting from, or in any way related to the 
Project, and agree that DOWL HKM’s total liability to 
Client under this Agreement shall be limited to 
$50,000.00.”13 
DOWL’s total fee under the contract, including amendments, 
totaled over 600,000.14  
DOWL, however, did not complete the work to Zirkelbach’s or 
FedEx’s standards.15 In their brief, Zirkelbach asserts over $1,000,000 in 
damages it suffered due to DOWL’s mistakes on multiple components of 
the facility’s design.16 
Originally, a third party sued Zirkelbach for unpaid construction 
liens.17 Zirkelbach added DOWL in a third party complaint, alleging 
negligence and breach of contract and seeking recovery for the substantial 
damages they incurred while fixing DOWL’s mistakes.18 DOWL filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment, asking the court to uphold the 
Agreement’s limitation of liability clause.19 The Court granted the 
                                           
8 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. at 2.  
14 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
15 Id. at 4–5. 
16 Id. at 5. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 5–6. 
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motion.20 After being denied certification of a final judgment, Zirkelbach 
filed this appeal.21    
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant Zirkelbach 
 
1.   Enforcement of the limitation of liability clause runs counter to 
Montana Statute and public policy. 
 
Zirkelbach first argues that the District Court erred by upholding 
DOWL’s limited liability clause because only under a “strained and 
inaccurate” reading of Montana law could such a clause be valid.22 
Montana Code Annotated section 28–7–202 provides that any contract 
which directly or indirectly exempts anyone from responsibility “for the 
person’s own fraud, for willful injury to the person or property of another, 
or for violation of the law, whether willful or negligent,” is against public 
policy.23 Zirkelbach maintains that the Court’s interpretation of this statute 
provides that any attempt to limit one’s liability to a nominal amount—as 
DOWL’s clause does—is invalid.24  
Turning to the clause itself, Zirkelbach provides two reasons why 
Montana’s statutory bar on exculpatory clauses must apply. 
Zirkelbach first argues that under California’s Tunkl25 test, 
limitation of liability to a nominal amount—here, less than 1/13th of 
DOWL’s professional fee and less than 1/24th of the damages Zirkelbach 
suffered—is exculpatory and therefore invalid.26 In Tunkl, the plaintiff 
signed a form when entering a hospital that released his doctors from any 
liability.27 The Court held that this kind of clause represented an 
unenforceable exculpatory clause.28 The Court then provided a six-factor 
test for determining if a clause was exculpatory: 1) The contract involves 
a business suitable for regulation; 2) The contracting party performs a 
service of great importance to the public, often a practical necessity for 
some; 3) The party holds itself out as willing to perform services for 
anyone willing to seek it; 4) There is an essential need for the party’s 
services which gives it a decisive bargaining power; 5) This superior 
bargaining power results in a standard contract of adhesion with 
                                           
20 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 6. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 8. 
23 Mont. Code Ann. § 28–7–202 (2015). 
24 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8–11. 
25 Tunkl v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).  
26 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Zirkelbach Construction, Inc. v. DOWL, LLC dba DOWL HKM, 
https://perma.cc/8HFN-QEVV (Mont. Apr. 7, 2017) (No. DA 16-0745). 
27 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442. 
28 Id. at 447. 
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exculpation: and, 6) The resulting contract gives the seller control over the 
buyer.29  
Zirkelbach argues that most, if not all, of these factors describe 
DOWL’s clause.30 First, DOWL was to perform “professional services,” 
which under the industry definition include state-regulated professions.31 
Second, Zirkelbach opines, DOWL was in the business of designing safe 
buildings, which is of great importance to both general contractors and the 
individuals who end up working in DOWL’s building.32 To the third 
factor, Zirkelbach only suggests that “DOWL obviously offers its 
professional services to anyone who needs them and is willing to pay.”33  
Zirkelbach threads together similar arguments to prove the final 
three Tunkl factors, and these arguments prove the most contentious. 
Zirkelbach argues that it was “obligated” by SunCap to utilize DOWL, in 
that SunCap specifically directed Zirkelbach in their contract to hire 
DOWL.34 Zirkelbach contends that the inability to choose a design 
company gave DOWL significant bargaining power, despite both parties 
being sophisticated entities.35 With this control, Zirkelbach argues the 
Agreement was a contract of adhesion and the limitation of liability clause 
was exculpatory.36  
Zirkelbach’s second argument that the clause is exculpatory 
maintains that the $50,000 limitation is so minimal that it rids DOWL’s 
incentive to perform professionally.37 Zirkelbach maintains that the 
limitation, when compared to the foreseeable damage and contracting fee, 
is nominal.38 Zirkelbach warns that allowing such nominal liability 
limitations leaves no “skin in the game” for professional companies such 
as DOWL, who can perform however they like with little repercussion.39 
This, Zirkelbach contends, is against public policy.40  
 
2.   Under Montana law regarding contract interpretation, the language 
of the parties’ contract was ambiguous, and therefore the limitation of 
liability clause should be void.  
 
Zirkelbach also argues that the Court should not uphold the 
limitation of liability clause because the clause and the contract are 
                                           
29 Id. at 444–445. 
30 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 17. 
33 Id. at 18. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
37 Id. at 21. 
38 Id. at 24. 
39 Id. at 23. 
40 Id. at 21. 
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ambiguous.41 Montana courts have held that a contract is ambiguous if “the 
language is susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting 
meanings,” based upon the understanding of the parties at the time of 
contracting.42   
Zirkelbach first argues that the limitation clause is ambiguous.43 
Specifically, Zirkelbach contends that the clause lacks clarity as to whether 
the limitation applies to all liability or only to liability for consequential 
damages; this ambiguity is due to conflicts between the clause’s title and 
its actual contents.44 Because there are two reasonable interpretations of 
this clause, Zirkelbach argues, the clause must be resolved in its favor.45  
Further, Zirkelbach maintains, when examining the whole of the 
contract, the clause is ambiguous.46 As evidence of this ambiguity, 
Zirkelbach points to contractual clauses which provide for professional 
liability insurance and communications between the parties regarding 
indemnification.47 This evidence, Zirkelbach provides, makes the 
limitation of consequential damages ambiguous.48 
 
B. Appellee DOWL 
 
1.   The District Court properly held that the limitation of liability clause 
clearly and unambiguously limits DOWL’s potential liability to $50,000. 
 
DOWL argues that the District Court properly upheld its 
limitation of liability clause because it is unambiguous.49 
DOWL contends Zirkelbach’s ambiguity argument fails for three 
reasons: first, Zirkelbach did not argue ambiguity at the District Court 
level; second, the clause itself is clear and unambiguous; and third, the 
addendums, amendments, and emails are unambiguous.50 DOWL 
highlights that the Court must not overstep its boundaries by attempting to 
interpret the Agreement, which was carefully and freely crafted between 
two sophisticated entities.51  
DOWL first contends that Zirkelbach never argued the contract 
was ambiguous before the District Court, which prevents Zirkelbach from 
raising ambiguity on appeal.52 In the appellant’s reply brief, Zirkelbach 
                                           
41 Id. at 24. 
42 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 25 citing Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex 
Harvest States, Coops., 164 P.3d 851 (Mont. 2007). 
43 Id. at 27–28. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 29. 
47 Id. at 29–34. 
48 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 34. 
49 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 6, at 9. 
50 Id. at 9–15. 
51 Id. at 7–8. 
52 Id. at 9–10. 
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contends that ambiguity was raised by the District Court in its 
Memorandum and Order granting the motion for partial summary 
judgment, giving Zirkelbach the power to argue ambiguity on appeal.53  
Second, DOWL refutes Zirkelbach’s argument that the clause 
itself is ambiguous.54 DOWL contends that the clause’s title—
Consequential damages/Limitation of Liability—clearly provides that 
consequential damages are limited under it. Further, DOWL argues that 
Zirkelbach’s reading of the clause ignores the “ordinary rules of 
grammar.”55  
Finally, DOWL argues that the contract as a whole is 
unambiguous.56 They cite that professional liability insurance is often used 
to insure third parties, and the communications about indemnification 
provided by Zirkelbach were not regarding liability indemnification.57  
 
2.   The limitation of liability clause is enforceable because it complies 
with Montana law and public policy.  
 
DOWL also argues that the clause must be upheld because it is not 
exculpatory.58 DOWL again highlights that the Agreement was drafted 
between two sophisticated entities with the freedom and ability to 
contract.59 
DOWL first contends that Zirkelbach failed to demonstrate that 
the limitation of damages clause is exculpatory.60 DOWL contends that 
the clause is instead a limitation of liability clause, which, unlike the 
exculpatory clauses Montana law rejects, does not completely eliminate 
liability.61 Zirkelbach’s arguments regarding exculpatory clauses, 
therefore, do not apply.62  
In fact, DOWL opines, limitation of liability clauses only seek to 
limit a specific type of liability.63 And, DOWL contends, a majority of 
jurisdictions including Montana have upheld limited liability clauses 
where, as here, they are made between two sophisticated entities.64 Even 
further, DOWL maintains that many of these jurisdictions have found that 
caps similar to the $50,000 DOWL provided are not “nominal.”65 As the 
cap is not nominal, DOWL provides that design companies like itself 
                                           
53 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 26, at 11. 
54 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 6, at 10–12. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 12. 
57 Id. at 13–15. 
58 Id. at 15. 
59 Id. at 21–23. 
60 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 6, at 15. 
61 Id. at 16. 
62 Id. at 15. 
63 Id. at 16. 
64 Id. at 17–20, 24 n.5. 
65 Id. at 25. 
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would not be excused from incentive to perform professionally if the court 
upheld the limitation of liability clause.66  
Thus, DOWL returns to the central tenant of its argument: that 
Zirkelbach, a sophisticated entity, knowingly negotiated and entered into 
the Agreement.67 DOWL points out that Zirkelbach is a large corporation 
that does business all over the United States and has both national and 
multi-national clients such as FedEx.68 Further, DOWL argues, the District 
Court found that both DOWL and Zirkelbach are sophisticated entities.69 
Specifically, DOWL contends that Zirkelbach was not required by SunCap 
to contract with DOWL, but instead that SunCap merely suggested 
Zirkelbach engage with DOWL.70 Without this required use, and with the 
established equality of bargaining between the parties, DOWL argues that 
a limitation of liability clause—such as the clause in the Agreement 
between DOWL and Zirkelbach—is enforceable.71  
Second, DOWL argues that Tunkl simply cannot apply to this 
case.72 Where Tunkl’s story regards an exculpatory clause made for a 
patient to exclude all liability of a hospital, DOWL argues the clause in 
this case is far from similar.73 In fact, DOWL contends that the California 
Supreme Court noted that the result in Tunkl would have been different if 
two private entities had negotiated to shoulder a liability.74 Thus, DOWL 
argues, Tunkl is inapplicable.75 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
This case places the Montana Supreme Court at the confluence of 
two important and long-standing traditions in Montana law—freedom to 
contract76 and the prohibition of limiting one’s own liability.77 
The Court may find that DOWL has a more persuasive argument 
because sophisticated entities should be able to freely contract without the 
court’s interference. This ruling would be in line with Montana’s tradition 
of allowing freedom to contract.78 Indeed, if the Court rules in favor of 
DOWL, parties will simply be held accountable for what they negotiate 
and agree to in a written contract. 
                                           
66 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 6, at 27. 
67 Id. at 21–23. 
68 Id. at 2.  
69 Id. 21.  
70 Id. at 22. 
71 Id. at 23. 
72 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 6, at 27. 
73 Id. at 27–28. 
74 Id. at 28. 
75 Id. at 29. 
76 See e.g., Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250 (Mont. 2003). 
77 See e.g., Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1986). 
78 See e.g., Arrowhead, 79 P.3d 250. 
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On the other hand, Zirkelbach has a strong argument from a public 
policy standpoint that allowing parties to limit their own liability would 
effectively eliminate the incentive to perform professionally. Indeed, if the 
Court allows DOWL’s limitation, anyone will be able to limit liability for 
their own negligent acts. 
However, given the freedom to contract, these negative 
ramifications of ruling in DOWL’s favor could be eliminated if parties 
simply remove limitation of liability clauses during negotiations. This will 
be particularly possible in contracts between two sophisticated entities, 
and the Court could limit their holding to apply only to contracts between 
these kinds of parties.  
In weighing these arguments, the Court may also consider Tunkl, 
which was relied upon heavily by Zirkelbach. However, DOWL appears 
to have the more persuasive argument against using this case, as the facts 
in Tunkl are highly distinguishable. This is particularly true because 
Zirkelbach’s argument on Tunkl does not firmly show the Court how 
Tunkl’s contract with a hospital for necessary medical services is the same 
as a contract between two private companies. If, however, the Court 
decides Tunkl is applicable, the determinative fact will likely be whether 
SunCap required Zirkelbach to hire DOWL. 
No matter how the Court rules, it will be defining an exculpatory 
clause. If the Court rules in favor of Zirkelbach, clauses that limit liability 
to a “nominal” amount become exculpatory. If, however, it rules in favor 
of DOWL, the line between a limitation of liability clause and an 
exculpatory clause will remain blurred. To defend a decision in favor of 
DOWL, the Court will likely have to define what it is about DOWL’s 
clause that makes it a limitation of liability, and therefore not exculpatory.   
Indeed, the Court can avoid the issue of defining the role of limited 
liability clauses in Montana jurisprudence if it finds the clause, or the 
contract as a whole, is ambiguous. It is more likely, however, that the issue 
of ambiguity will not be the deciding issue in this case. 
At oral argument, the parties will likely attempt to define an 
exculpatory clause. The Court will likely ask Zirkelbach why Tunkl should 
apply, and the Court’s questions for DOWL will likely center around 
DOWL’s true intentions of including the limitation of damages clause. 
Ultimately, the Court’s holding will determine to what extent parties can 
freely contract away their liability.  
